This document is made available in accordance with publisher policies. Please cite only the published version using the reference above. Abstract: This study develops a framework to compare the ability of alternative earnings forecast approaches to capture the market expectation of future earnings. Given prior evidence of analysts' systematic optimistic bias, we decompose earnings surprises into analysts' earnings surprises and adjustments based on alternative forecasting models. An equal market response to these two components indicates that the associated earnings forecast is a sufficient estimate of the market expectation of future earnings. To apply our framework, we examine four recent regression-based earnings forecasting models, alongside a simple earnings-based random walk model and analysts' forecasts. Using the earnings forecasts of the model that satisfies our sufficiency condition, we identify a set of stocks for which the market is unduly pessimistic about future earnings. The investment strategy of buying and holding these stocks generates statistically significant abnormal returns. We offer an explanation as to why this and similar strategies might be successful.
Introduction
Investors use a variety of sources of information to form their expectations of a firm's future earnings and stock returns. Undoubtedly one of the more influential sources is analysts' reports. Analysts have access to a wider variety of information than most investors, including personal contacts with senior executives of companies. Nonetheless, or perhaps because of these contacts, their one-year-ahead forecasts are known to have a systematic optimistic bias.
Although regression-based models use a much more restricted information set, their proponents argue that their more objective and rigorous treatment of information is likely to lead to a more reliable forecast of earnings. There is no consensus on what is the best proxy for the market expectation of future earnings.
Our study focuses on providing a theoretical framework for identifying superior forecasting ability in a set of contrasting models. We apply our framework to six different forecasting models, including those made by analysts. The one-year-ahead forecasts of one of the models are found to be more informative than analysts' forecasts about the market expectation of future earnings. We then exploit this superiority to implement an investment strategy that is shown to consistently generate significant abnormal returns.
Knowing the market expectation of future earnings is important for use in portfolio formation, implied cost of capital estimation and investors' behaviour studies. However, owing to the unobservable nature of the market expectation, a generally accepted method is to study the earnings response coefficient (ERC), which is the price reaction to errors in the earnings forecast (Ball and Brown 1968) . Nevertheless, much of the work in this area has proceeded on an ad-hoc empirical basis using basic regression techniques without a 3 theoretical foundation.
1 Although we also use a linear regression-based approach, we develop a theoretical framework by which the relative contribution of corrections to analysts' forecast errors can be evaluated in terms of the correlation structure of errors in forecasts. Using this framework, we explore the relationship of unexpected returns to two measures of earnings surprise: analysts' forecast errors and adjustments based on alternative forecasting models.
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The equal earnings response coefficient of these two measures is evidence that the modelbased forecast alone provides a sufficient estimate of the market expectation of future earnings.
To evaluate our new approach, we use four recent regression-based earnings forecasting models alongside a simple earnings-based random walk (RW) model and analysts' forecasts. The regression-based models are (1) the Hou, van Dijk and Zang (HDZ) model (Hou et al. 2012) ; (2) the SO model (So 2013) ; (3) the Konchitchki, Lou, Sadka and Sadka (KLSS) model (Konchitchki, et al. 2013) ; and (4) the Harris and Wang (HW) model (Harris and Wang 2013) . To predict future earnings, these models use different combinations of subsets of publicly available information, ranging from accounting information and market information to analysts' forecasts. 3 All the regression-based models are claimed to outperform analysts' forecasts in terms of forecast accuracy and/or the ERC. Our analysis is primarily concerned with the relative merits of alternative one-year-ahead earnings forecast proxies since financial statements are announced on a yearly basis and accounting information-based models can therefore provide a forecast once a year at most.
1 Ohlson (1991) comments: 'Another theoretical problem concerns the relevance of unexpected earnings as a variable explaining returns. This construct appears to have the status of a "folklore concept" with limited economic content'. 2 The former error equals the deviation of analysts' forecast from the actual reported earnings while the latter is the deviation of model-based forecasts from analysts' forecast. 3 The HDZ and SO models base their earnings forecasts purely on accounting information. The KLSS model uses both market information (past stock returns) and analysts' forecasts. The HW model is adapted by Harris and Wang (2013) using the theoretical approach in Ashton and Wang (2013) . This model uses both accounting and market information to predict future earnings.
We decompose earnings surprise proxies associated with these earnings forecasts into analysts' forecast errors and adjustments based on alternative forecasting models. Regressing unexpected returns on these two components shows that only the KLSS model has an equal ERC for these two components, satisfying the condition laid out in our framework. It implies that the KLSS model is the superior proxy for the market expectation of one-year-ahead earnings. Further investigation reveals that this KLSS model is effectively an optimal combination of the two benchmarks -analysts' forecasts of earnings and a RW modelagainst which regression-based forecasts have normally been separately evaluated.
We examine the economic evidence for our findings by applying them to a strategy of portfolio formation. While analysts' forecasts are the most forward looking, the deviations of the KLSS forecasts, a historical data-based model, from those of analysts reflect the expected market's correction for analysts' errors. A significant negative deviation might signal overadjustments and an unduly pessimistic forecast of one-year-ahead earnings. Thus, if this is true, buying and holding these stocks should generate statistically significant abnormal returns. Hence, we implement a buy-and-hold policy for the stocks in the bottom 10% of the differences between earnings forecasts of the KLSS model and the consensus forecasts of analysts. The results show that this strategy, on average, generates statistically significant positive abnormal returns of 3.4% for one-month buy-and-hold investments and 8.8% for one-year buy-and-hold investments.
In summary, our paper contributes to the literature by developing a rigorous formal framework for comparing earnings forecasts of financial analysts and other models in terms of capturing the market expectation of future earnings. By understanding the statistical implication of observed values of ERC in terms of the correlation between forecast errors, we are able to identify a forecasting model, the KLSS model, which contains more information about one-year-ahead forecasts of market expectations than that of analysts. We show that 5 this forecast is effectively based on an adjusted combination of benchmarks against which regression-based forecasts have hitherto been measured. We exploit the information content of the KLSS forecast, which is additional to that of analysts, to produce a viable investment strategy. Finally, we offer a new explanation as to why one-year-ahead regression-based forecasting models may offer profitable investment strategies.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical analysis that guides our empirical investigations. Section 3 describes the model structure and data. Section 4 contains the empirical results, while section 5 describes an investment strategy based on these results. Section 6 concludes and outlines the implications of our study.
Motivation and theoretical foundations for the value of information

Motivation
Earnings data are an important input for fundamental valuation and asset-allocation decisions (Hou et al. 2012) . Accurate earnings forecasts help to improve the quality of these decisions while better estimates of the market expectations of accounting earnings are important for many reasons. First, they can be used in the context of investment analysis. If one is able to predict future reported earnings precisely and shows that these forecasts are different from the market's expectation of future earnings embedded in price, it should be possible to generate excess returns. Second, the market expectations of future earnings are used in the estimation of implied cost of capital (e.g. Claus and Thomas 2001 , Gebhardt et al. 2001 , Easton and Monahan 2005 , which is an important input for capital appraisal investment and financial budgeting decisions. Any estimation errors of the market earnings expectation will lead to inaccurate estimation of the implied cost of capital and suboptimal investment decisions.
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While the forecast quality can be assessed based on forecast bias or accuracy (Foster 1977 , Fama and French 2000 , Hou et al. 2012 , So 2013 , determining whether such a forecast contains valuable information about the market expectation of future earnings is more challenging because the market expectation is unobservable. A more generally accepted method is to examine the price reaction to errors in the earnings forecast (ERC). The implication is that the higher the ERC, the better the model is at capturing the market expectation of earnings (Beaver 1970 , Fried and Givoly 1982 , Brown et al. 1987a , O'Brien 1988 , Hou et al. 2012 ).
Based on the ERC measure, early researchers found analysts' forecasts outperformed the random walk and univariate time-series models (Brown and Rozeff 1978 , Fried and Givoly 1982 , Brown et al. 1987a . Hence, they have been extensively used as a proxy for the market expectation of future earnings in the context of the estimation of earnings surprise (Brown et al. 1987a , Walther 1997 ) and the implied cost of capital (Claus and Thomas 2001 , Gebhardt et al. 2001 , Easton et al. 2002 , Botosan and Plumlee 2005 , Easton and Monahan 2005 . However, more recent literature has argued that analysts' forecasts are less accurate than the simple RW model under some conditions (Bradshaw et al. 2012, Gerakos and Gramacy 2013) and regression-based models (such as Hou et al. 2012 , So 2013 . Analysts forecasts also contain both systematic forecast bias and prediction errors (Abarbanell and Bushee 1997 , Frankel and Lee 1998 , Bradshaw et al. 2001 , Easton and Sommers 2007 , Hughes et al. 2008 , Dichev and Tang 2009 , Bradshaw 2011 , Bosquet et al. 2015 .
Given the possibly predictable nature of analysts' forecast errors, investors might rationally seek to adjust analysts' forecasts for their biases (Feldman et al. 2003) . Hughes et al. (2008) and So (2013) estimate the predictable component of analysts' errors as the difference between more accurate earnings forecasts and analysts' forecasts. They argue that if the strategy of sorting firms by the predicted errors fails to generate abnormal returns, 7 investors know analysts' errors. Hughes et al. (2008) find that the market is able to predict analysts' forecast errors, while So (2013) concludes that the market fails to do so and that the market still overweighs analysts' forecasts. Other researchers (Hou et al. 2012 , Harris and Wang 2013 , Li and Mohanram 2014 claim that their regression-based forecasts outperform analysts' forecasts in terms of capturing the market expectation of future earnings.
Explanations for these controversial findings remain limited due to the lack of a solid theoretical foundation for model evaluation. We therefore develop a new approach to evaluate whether a model is a sufficient estimate of the market earnings expectation by exploring the relationship between the unanticipated earnings surprises based on analysts'
forecasts, and any adjustment that can be provided by additional information contained in regression-based forecasts. This is the subject of the discussion in the next section.
Information measures and earnings response coefficients
The random variables   represents a positive bias or optimism on the part of analysts. The assumption of zero means and normality of the model-based forecast errors justifies the regression process and will be evidenced in the empirical work that follows. 
where 1  and 2  are coefficients associated with analysts' forecast errors and expected corrections for analysts' forecast errors. Theoretical values of these coefficients are derived in Appendix A.
We further assume that the price reaction during the earnings announcements, or unexpected return (UR), follows a mean variance model, with the expected one-year-ahead price response being subject to an uncertainty adjustment:
7 For reasons of clarity, at this stage time subscripts are omitted. 
Here the ratio   implies that the regression-based forecast by itself is a sufficient statistic for analysts' forecasts. In this case, the relative weight given to the analysts' forecast in equation (5) is zero and the price reaction can be explained purely in terms of the error in the regression-based forecast.
Model structure and data selection
Model structure
At time t , in order to predict earnings at time 1 t  , we assume that all our investors who rely on regression-based models study the relation between earnings and its determinants from a restricted information set ( IS ), as in equation (9) 
We select four recent studies which use different combinations of the information set, including accounting information, market information and analysts' forecasts, as detailed in Appendix B. Interestingly, three out of the four models claim to be better than analysts in terms of forecast accuracy and/or earnings response coefficients. This is despite the fact that they use publicly available accounting and finance information, which appears to be just a subset of what analysts use (Brown et al. 2015) . We also investigate a random walk model without drift. As a benchmark against which the performance of the regression-based models is assessed, we use analysts' earnings per share (EPS) forecasts from I/B/E/S. A comparison of analysts' forecasts with the others should provide evidence of the degree to which different information sets predict market expectations of the future earnings. It also potentially provides evidence or otherwise of analysts' competence, who are considered to be dominant information intermediaries in capital markets (Frankel et al. 2006 ).
Data selection
The sample includes all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ listed securities with a fiscal year-end of 31 st December and sharecode 10/11 at the intersection of the CRSP monthly returns file, the COMPUSTAT fundamental annual file and the I/B/E/S consensus EPS forecast files from January 1983 to December 2015. We use Cusip8 to merge the two databases. The start date is chosen due to the low availability of analysts' forecasts prior to 1983 and the sample period is similar to that of Hou et al. (2012) and Konchitchki et al. (2013) . To mitigate the effect of outliers, earnings and other variables each year are winsorized at the 1 st and 99 th percentiles.
We return to this issue later in this section.
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We follow Konchitchki et al. (2013) and So (2013) in using only companies with December fiscal year-ends. Analysts' forecasts are collected in April each year, allowing for a reporting lag of three months. This ensures that neither regression-based models nor analysts have an information advantage over the others, since information about these companies as well as analysts' forecasts is announced at approximately the same time.
Compared with that of Hou et al. (2012) , our research design provides a better match between the return window and the horizon of the expected earnings measure, as well as aligning analysts' forecast accuracy. 9 Furthermore, as well documented, varying seasonal and investor sentiment affects stock price and excess returns are positively correlated with such shifts in sentiment Kinney 1976, Lee et al. 2002) . Hence, using only December year-end firms, whose earnings are announced during a similar period, allows us to isolate the impact of economic conditions and/or investor sentiment on the return-earnings regression. Because of this fiscal year-end requirement, our sample accounts for approximately 55% of the whole population. As a result, generalizability could be limited because December year-end firms are typically larger than non-December year-end firms and associated with different levels of price reaction (Smith and Pourciau 1988, Bamber et al. 2000) . Table 1 shows the number of firm-year observations for each model at every stage, including the sample used, earnings forecasts, earnings forecasts after merging with other models, scaling and matching with annualized abnormal stock returns. The regression-based models, HDZ and HW, unsurprisingly have greater coverage than analysts. The KLSS model has the poorest coverage since it requires a minimum of two consecutive years of actual EPS data together with the corresponding analysts' forecast. We obtain a sample of 27,903 firmyear observations, which contains observations that are available across models and abnormal stock returns. Nevertheless, while analysts aim to forecast the actual I/B/E/S earnings, the statistical comparison with regression-based modellers is based on winsorized values, placing an unfair disadvantage on analysts. Hence, the sample is later reduced to 26,506 when observations with winzorized earnings are removed to provide a level playing field for analysts' and model-based earnings forecasts. The need for a common dataset probably results in a concentration of larger companies with established analyst coverage.
<Insert Table 1 about here>   Table 2 To establish the relationship between earnings at time t and the information set at time 1 t  , as in equation (9), we estimate the predictor coefficients of regression-based models and present the results in Table 3. <Insert Table 3 forecasting a different measure of earnings -an issue that we will have to deal with when we try to make comparisons between the competing models.
The forecasting models compared
Forecast bias of models
We next compute forecasts for each regression model by multiplying the estimated coefficients by the predictors at time t to generate earnings estimates for time 1 t  , as in equation (10). Earnings surprises are defined as actual reported earnings minus the forecasts, as in equation (11). We noted in Section 3 that our models aim to predict three different measures of earnings. The HDZ model predicts non-scaled earnings, while analysts and the SO and RW models predict EPS, and the KLSS model forecasts the future EPS/price ratio.
To ensure the comparability of the models, we scale the different earnings surprises to produce a common measurement basis in the form of forward earnings yield (EPS/price).
11 Table 4 presents the summary statistics of these earnings surprise proxies. Panel A compares the earnings surprises of alternative one-year-ahead earnings forecasts. The sizes and signs of the earnings surprises are indicative of any bias in the different earnings forecasts. As expected, by their construction, none of the regression-based models display statistically significant bias. In line with the literature, we observe a significant negative error in the forecasts made by analysts, indicating optimism. We should also remember that for comparability with our regression models, this statistic is for the earliest forecasts of analysts, which accounts for the relatively high degree of optimism (Ciciretti et al. 2009 ).
Nevertheless, they are more accurate than forecasts of the RW, HDZ, HW and SO models based on the absolute earnings surprise (AES) statistics. Interestingly, there is no significant difference between the accuracy of the analysts' forecasts and the KLSS model.
<Insert Table 4 about here> Nevertheless, like most previous studies, we have winsorized our data at the 1% level.
Thus, we have effectively replaced 'unacceptable' actual reported earnings with a figure that we regard as more acceptable for the fitting of the regression model. This puts analysts, who are allowed no such discretion, at a disadvantage in terms of forecast accuracy. We thus eliminate winsorized reported earnings data and run our subsequent analysis on the slightly reduced sample (Panel B). We find that in terms of accuracy as measured by the mean absolute deviation, analysts' forecasts are the most accurate.
12 This superiority is statistically significant (Panel C). 13 In addition, the variability in the absolute error of analysts' forecasts is the least. Among regression-based models, the KLSS model, which uses analysts'
forecasts, past-year earnings and past-year stock return, outperforms the rest in terms of forecast accuracy.
In Panel D, we report the time-series average correlation of alternative proxies of earnings surprises. The correlations between all the models is positive. In general, the correlation coefficient reflects the degree of communality of the input dataset, with that of the KLSS model and analysts' forecasts being the highest. The KLSS model also has a high degree of correlation with the RW model. We will explore the implications of these observations in more depth in Section 5.2. The lower degree of correlation between analysts'
forecasts with the regression models based purely on accounting values (HDZ, HW and SO)
is a likely reflection of the fact that analysts also make extensive use of non-accounting information to form their predictions.
Earnings response coefficients and the preliminary result of the information theory
Our primary interest is the prediction of future price movements in response to errors in forecasts of earnings. Hence, we measure the earnings response coefficient (ERC), which reflects the stock market reaction for one unit of unexpected earnings by scaling all forecast 12 The AESs in analysts' forecast reported are further disadvantaged by the 'optimism' of 0.0146 in Table 4 . The triangle inequality implies that the absolute deviation is between the reported figure 0.0297 and 0.0151 (= 0.0297-0.0146) in the absence of such bias. In addition, the high value of the t-statistics suggests less variation in the absolute deviation than in the other measures. 13 A negative entry in a column implies that the column variable has a lower absolute error, while a positive entry in a row implies that the row variable has a lower absolute error.
surprises by the standard deviation of surprises, using regression equation (12). 14 This structure emphasizes that ERCs vary across firms ( j ) and over time:
where ,1 jt ACAR  denotes annualized cumulative abnormal return which equals the sum of four quarterly earnings announcement abnormal returns (market adjusted, from day -1 to day 1).
15 Table 5 <Insert Table 5 about here>   Panel B of Table 5 shows the differences between ERC estimates together with their corresponding t-statistics. We find that the ERCs of the KLSS model and analysts' forecasts are statistically indifferent yet they are statistically significantly higher than all the others.
These are the best-performing models in terms of capturing the market expectation of future earnings. We also note in general the pivotal role of analysts' forecasts in forming market expectations, where it too dominates all the other models except for the KLSS model.
We check the robustness of our findings by adding the contemporaneous values of control variables, which are used in the literature as the determinants of earnings response coefficients, into the return-earnings regression (Table 6 ). The control variable set includes the firms' beta (Collins and Kothari 1989, Zolotoy 2012) , dividend pay-out ratio (Kallapur 1994 , Mande 1994 , leverage ratio, market-to-book ratio (MB) (Collins and Kothari 1989, Zolotoy 2012) , negative earnings dummy and non-dividend paying dummy (Hayn 1995) , earnings volatility (Dichev and Tang 2009 ), accrual quality (Perotti and Wagenhofer 2014) and the number of analysts' forecasts (Bartov et al. 1999 ).
We find that the changes in the numerical values of the ERCs of all the models are relatively minor. The ERC of the KLSS model remains the highest (from Panel A). Further tests, which are shown in Panel B of Table 6 , indicate that it is statistically higher than those of the other forecasts, including analysts' forecasts. This confirms the robustness of earlier results. However, as we have shown in our theoretical framework, we still need to explore the relative contribution of modellers' forecasts in providing additional information about market expectations. We address this in the next section.
<Insert Table 6 about here>
Earnings surprise decomposition and the value of information
So far, we have investigated the properties of the forecasts in isolation. In general, we find that analysts' forecasts perform well in terms of forecast accuracy but present a systematic upward bias. Hence, to compare the relative merits of regression-based forecasts with those of analysts to ascertain whether predictable adjustments to analysts' forecasts exist, we decompose market earnings surprise into the two components outlined in Section 2 and perform the following regressions: <Insert Table 7 about here> Finally, we conduct robustness checks by adding control variables in the returnearnings regression and present the time-series averages of its coefficients in Table 8 . The relative performance of the models as measured by 1  and 2  remains largely unchanged, with the KLSS model being superior.
<Insert Table 8 about here>
Portfolio formation
Investment strategy
A principal reason for trying to get a better forecast of the market expectation of future earnings is to identify a strategy upon which we can construct a profitable investment portfolio. 17 In our case, we are dealing with one-year-ahead forecasts. If a subset of one-yearahead forecasts proves to be overly pessimistic then we are likely to see an initial fall in value. Once actual earnings figures, which we assume will be higher than market expectations, are announced, stock prices are likely to respond positively. Hence, buying and holding stocks in this 'overly pessimistic' subset should prove a profitable investment strategy. On the other hand, for the subset of overoptimistic forecasts, overvaluation occursthat is, buying and holding stocks in this subset leads to losses. The practical problem of these strategies is that the market expectation of future earnings is unobservable so the determination of whether particular forecasts are overly pessimistic is not immediately obvious. (Table 9 and Figure 1 ). Here EACAR equals annualized cumulative abnormal returns (ACAR) minus the mean of annualized cumulative abnormal returns ( ̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅ ). We observe positive <Insert Table 9 about here> In the next section, we simulate and evaluate the performance of an investment strategy of buying and holding stocks in the low (high) earnings forecast difference subsets. 
Portfolio performance
We examine more formally an investment strategy that exploits the difference between the KLSS forecasts and analysts' forecasts. On 1 st May each year, when all data and earnings forecasts are available for each year between 1985 and 2014, we first eliminate stocks in the top and bottom 1% of the earnings forecast differences to avoid picking up outliers. We then construct two buy-and-hold portfolios based on the differences in earnings forecasts of the KLSS model and those of analysts. One portfolio is formed from stocks in the lowest 10%
(the low portfolio) and the other is formed from stocks in the highest 10% (the high portfolio).
We calculate buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) having adjusted for risks, as suggested by Fama (1998) , using both the market model and the Fama-French five-factor model (Fama and French, 2015) with various holding periods ranging from a month to a year.
Since we form an equally weighted portfolio, we use the equally weighted CRSP portfolio as a proxy for the market portfolio.
Panel A of If we examine the pattern of the excess returns, we notice that most of the gains in Table 10 forecasts.
Conclusion
In this paper, we develop a theoretical framework for comparing the information content of alternative earnings forecasts in terms of the correlation coefficients between errors in forecasts of market expectations. We establish conditions under which a forecast proxy dominates that of analysts and provides a sufficient estimate of the market expectation of future earnings. Based on the theory, we explore the information content of forecasts made by analysts and compare these with the RW model and four differently constructed regression-24 based approaches. We introduce a level playing field by removing any winsorized data, which is typically adjusted prior to regression analysis being carried out. We investigate the various forecasts in terms of forecast bias over actual reported earnings and the alignment to market expectation of future earnings.
We confirm that although analysts' forecasts are upwardly biased over actual reported earnings, in general within our subset of observations they are more accurate than other firmcharacteristic regression-based models (the HDZ, HW and SO models). Meanwhile, the forecasts from the KLSS model, which in effect combines analysts' forecasts with lagged one-year-return adjustment, are less biased and have a higher earnings response coefficient.
However, we also draw attention to the limitation of this and other studies. In our case, the need for a common dataset probably results in a concentration of larger companies with an established following of analysts. This does not deny the possibility that other regression models covering a greater number of smaller companies with a thinner analyst following could be found to outperform the one-year-ahead analysts' forecasts.
Finally, we conclude that within our dataset consisting of larger companies, the KLSS model still contains information additional to analysts' one-year-ahead forecasts. By concentrating on the most pessimistic subset, we can identify portfolios that outperform the market on a risk-adjusted basis. Further consideration of our results strongly suggests that the market initially forms its expectation based on recent performance, which forms part of the basis of the KLSS model. An application of this idea using US data from 1983 to 2015
suggests the existence of a profitable and exploitable investment strategy. We attribute this apparent violation of market efficiency to the market overweighting recent poor performance.
Our research draws attention to the importance of a theoretical framework that facilitates the understanding and interpretation of various empirical results. This analysis adds 25 structure to the large literature on the superiority of various forecasting models. In our case, the statistical analysis of the underlying determinants of the earnings response coefficient provides the basis for comparing competing models used in forecasting earnings. Such models form the basis of equity valuation. It also provides a framework that helps understand how mechanistic forecasting models might outperform analysts' forecasts when analysts have access to sophisticated forecasting models, alongside superior private information. We argue that one answer lies in the market overweighting, or anchoring on, recent poor performance.
We show how this observation can be exploited using a mechanistic selection technique that is not prone to such biases. This latter observation presents a rich vein for investment practitioners to explore and understand other similar contrarian strategies.
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Appendix A: Decomposition of the maximum likelihood function of the market earnings surprises As discussed in Section 2, we have the forecasting system following equation (2) The maximum likelihood of the market earnings surprise given observed analysts' surprise and model-based surprise is as follows: 
This gives us a theoretical value for the relative weights in equation (3) 
We now consider the cases where the forecast produced by the regression model forecasts is a sufficient statistic for the analysts' forecast. We assume that Here analysts' forecasts are just a noisy version of the model's forecast. Adjusted stock price three months after the fiscal year-end (end of March).
KLSS model
Dependent variable: (CIB) Actual change in earnings measured as changes in I/B/E/S EPS deflated by stock price.
RETt
Lagged one-year compound returns from 1 April last year to 1 April this year. CAFt Change in earnings forecasted by analysts, which is the analysts' median consensus forecast for the current period minus the previous period's earnings.
SO model
Dependent variable: (IBTS) Net income before extraordinary items and after subtracting special items and taxes deflated by adjusted number of shares outstanding. Indicator for non-dividend payer, one when firms do not pay dividend, and zero otherwise. DIVt Dividends per share equal dividends for common equity divided by the number of shares. BMt Book-to-market ratios equal common equity divided by market capitalization. APRCt
Adjusted stock price at fiscal year-end (end of December).
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Appendix B: Variables' descriptions and information sets (Cont.)
Other Variables Beta Downloaded from WRDS/CRSP dated 11 July 2016. DPR Dividend pay-out ratios equal dividends divided by earnings before extraordinary items. LEV Leverage ratios which equal long-term debt divided by the market value of assets. MB Market-to-book ratios equal market capitalization divided by total common equity. E_vol
Earnings volatility equals standard deviation of deflated earnings (total earnings/average total assets) of the last five years (minimum of three-year requirement). DA Discretionary accruals estimated the approach in Jones (1991) . NEAF Number of analysts' forecasts from I/B/E/S. To ensure the matching window between returns and earnings surprises and align firms' business nature, our study uses only firms with December fiscal year-end and sharecode 10/11 (excluding ADRs, close-end funds and REITS), which account for about 55% of the whole population. c Earnings forecasts: to generate earnings forecasts, we need information available for at least two consecutive years (for the case of the HDZ, SO and KLSS models) or three consecutive years (for the case of the HW model). This reduces the number of firm-year observations of earnings forecasts. d Number of earnings forecast observations available for all models. e Scaling earnings surprises: earnings surprises in year 1 t  are scaled by adjusted share prices in March of year t for the case of the AF, RW, HW and SO models and by market capitalization in March of year t for the case of the HDZ model. The absence of price information causes a slight fall in the number of firm-year observations. f Matching earnings surprise return: returns (ACAR) are the annualized cumulative abnormal returns of four quarterly earnings announcements that are market adjusted from day -1 to day +1. We require firms to have non-missing price information for those days. In addition, there are cases where the earnings forecast is available while the actual reported earnings are missing. The absence of price information or of the actual reported earnings for some firms in some years causes a fall in the number of observations when we match earnings surprises with the returns. g Excluding winsorized earnings for a fair forecast accuracy comparison. (-5.41 ) (-4.85 ) (-5.10 ) (-5.46 ) (-5.27 ) (-4.74 (-7.65 ) (-11.23 ) (-11.29) (-8.87 ) (-6.27 ) (-9.15) (-11.20) (-8.38 
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